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ABSTRACT
When a small finn sells goods or services to another firm, ir generally grants trade
credit to tlie buyer fvr these purchases. While the academic and practitioner literature on
credit management for large firms is voluminous, rhere is little in ibis literature which suggests
appropriate credit invnagenient strategies, given the particular characteristics of the small
finn. Set eral characteristics of small firms can lead to advantageous credit policies which are
differenr from larger firms. Among these are rerurns-to-scale problems in adopting several
credit management strategies, manogement which Iias limited erperrise iii finance, and
resrricied access to ourside financiiig. In this paper, the effecrs vf these differences oii trade
credit straregy are considered. Pour areas ofcredit strategy are analyzedi credit investigatioii
arid risk assessment, credit-granting decisions, cvllectivns, and bearing credir risk. The paper
Irresents and cririques trade credit policie~ for the sniall firinin each vf these areas, iiicluding
pvlicy alternatives which invvlve the outsourcing vf one or niore aspects of credir
management.
INTRODUCTION
When one business sells to another, the buyer typically purchases on trade credit. The
accounts receivable created when trade credit is granted is a major asset for those small firms
who sell to other businesses, and the selection of appropriate strategies for the management of
these receivables can enhance the firm's chances of survival and growth.
There is little in the litcraturc to guide the small firm's owner/manager in the selection
of advantageous credit managcmcnt strategies. Articles in academic and practitioner small
business journals usually outline the basics of credit management (for example, Atkinson,
1992; Knowles, 1989; and Faria, 1976) or descnbe the credit management methodologies used
hy larger lirms, ignoring the imponant differences between large and small firms (for example,
"Effective credit policics: Maximize sales and minimize bad debts," 1987). Further. texts in
the linancial management of small 1mns tend to treat credit managcmcnt lightly, concentrating
instead on the problems of raising funds and of evaluating capital investments.'n this
'or example, Walker and Petty, 1986, devote 10 pages to credit managcmem, 122 pages to raising
funds (exclusive o( capital structure decisions, which are discussed separately), and 31 pages to capital
hudgcting.
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nonnativc paper. wc prcscnt some prescriptions I'or advantageous credit management strategies
for small linns. drawing from the larger literature on credit managcmcnt I'or large lions and
contrasting strategies between large and small. The paper deals cntircly with the granting of
credit rather than the inanageinent of credit received I'rom other firins.
CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL FIRMS
WHICH INFLUENCE CREDIT POLICY
There are several differences between small firms anil large which make small
I'irms'redit
policy decisions unlike those of larger fiona. The I'irst crinccrns a rctuins-to-scale
problem in employing inany credit managcmcnt icchniqucs. Crct)it inanagcmcnt strategy
largely concerns thc control of credit-related costs. Two major types ol audit-rclatcd costs are
had debt expense and accounts rcccivablc carrying costs, both ol'hich arc proportional to the
dollar value ol'hc firm's receivables portfolio. Bad debt expcnsc rcprcscnts thc portion
of'ccounts
rcccivahle that go uncollcctcd because customers dcl'suit. Thc largm'hc accounts
rcccivablc ponfolio, the greater thc number of such defaults and thc highm thc dollar bad debt
expcnsc. Accounts receivable carrying costs rcprcscnt the time value of money for investmcnt
in thc accounts receivable asset, and are coinputed as a required return times the dollar
investment in accounts receivable. Thus, the larger the portfolio, thc greater arc accounts
receivable carrying costs. (For morc discussion of these costs, sce Schcrr, 1989a, pp. 159-165.)
Many credit strategies reduce these costs but rcquirc that the lirm bear other costs
which arc lixctl in nature (a good exainple of this is thc hiring of a professional credit manager
to make credit decisions). Since the receivables ponfolio of the small lirm is sinaller in dollar
amount than that of the larger I'inn, the smaller lirm is at a returns-to-scale disadvantage in
reducing bad debt and accounts receivable carrying costs by employing credit strategies
entailing such I'ixcd costs (Mian & Smith, 1992).
The second difl'ercnce concerns the expenisc ol'he small 1irm's owner/manager. The
owner/manager's knowlcdgc is typically centered in the product or scrvicc sold. Few
iiwncr/managers of small firms have thc level ol''inancial cxpcrtisc necessary to perl'orm thc
type of'crctlit analysis undcrtakcn at large lmns. This is partly because owner/managers seem
to firn) thc credit I'unction particularly distasteful and avoid it (Grahowsky, 1976).
I.inally, hccausc of agency problems and problems in thc transmission of information
and in monitoring thc firm, small linus will have higher costs of cxtcrnal capital than larger
linus of the same business and Iinancial nsk. Owners of small limis have both a grcatcr ability
to alter the I'inn to bcnclit themselves to the detriment of outside investors and a grcatcr
incentive do so. Also, outside investors typically have less ability to assess thc risk ol'he
small liim than thc larger finn bccausc the small finn does not gcneratc the plethora of audited
linancial suucmcnts and other reports that larger firms do. Investors musi price these factors,
and thus charge morc for funds. (See Pettit and Singer (1985) and Ang (1991/1992) for
literature rcvicws of these and other differences in financing large and small firms.)
The result is that, for small firms, internal cash liows arc by far thc least expensive
source of'inancing; small lirms follow the pecking order I'inancing strategy dcscribcd by
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Myers (1984). However, unlike external ltnancing, the amount of internal linancing available
is lirniled, as it comes from the firm's cash f)ow stream. The result is a considerably greater
concern for safeguarding the cash flow stream, a concern which needs io be manifest in the
I'inn's credit policies.
CREDIT STRATEGIES FOR SMALL FIRMS
Mian and Smith (1992) define credit management as involving the I'ollowing
I'unctions
I. Credit investi ation and risk assessment: who performs this and how investigation
and assessment are performed (what sources of information arc used, ctc.).
C~dh i: h d id. hi h ppii" . k' 'i,h hi.d
is suade, how much credit is granted, and thc terms under which credit is granted.
3. Collection: who perl'onus it and how it is to hc performed (what collection strategies
arc lo bc used and the tnning ol'hcsc straicgies).
~a'»dk:hksh issih.»dr
Thc selling finn has many altcrnativcs in managing each ol'hese I'unctions. These
altcrnativcs arc of two general types. Thc lirst arc internal alternatives: dilfercnt ways of
performing the lunction in-house. The second arc outsourcin alternatives: contracting out all
or part ol'a particular function.
Mian and Smith (l 992) consider thc outsourcing alternatives. They point out that thc
outsourcing aspect of credit policy has lo do with the costs and risks of credit-granting and who
bears these costs and nsks. The ltmi may choose to bear these or it may contract with an
outside ugcnt, paying thc agent to bear them. Whether it is advantageous for thc lirm to do this
depends on whether it has a comparative advantage in bearing the costs or risks itscll'. (That
is, whcthcr it can do the job morc cheaply than an outsider.) The amount ol this comparative
a&lvantagc, we will argue, is greatly affcctcd by thc characteristics ol'mall I'irms previously
discussed.
Mian and Smith reason that thc various institutional arrangements which sun'ound
trade credit arc actually mechanisms lor all stealing costs and nsk between the firm and outside
contractors. They generate a very interesting table which relates some institutional outsourcing
alternatives to the four credit I'unctions previously discussed; these relationships arc presented
in Table I.
Mian and Smith also consider another dunenuon ol'radlit ntnnagentent, who finances the accounts reccivahle nsset.
While finanmng consideratioiis are imponant to thc hnrdu firm, wc wish to concentrate solely on the asset manngement
rather than linancmg aspects of credit pohcy. and thus exclude such considernuons from our analysis.
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While these institutional strategies are I'amiliar to most readers, this table is very
uscl'ul I'or thinking ah&iut credit manag«ment policy decisions which involve outsourcing;u&d
their relationship to thc lirm's crisis and risk. Thc polar opposites are "Crcncral Corporate
Crctfii", I'or which nothing is outsourccd (the seller performs all the functions and bears all thc
costs and risks) and "Non-Recourse Factoring," where everything is outsourced. Note also
that some of these stratcgics are not mutually exclusive, and that the firm can combine them
to change the allocation of costs and risk. For example, the linn can use a credit information
l&rm tn collect information and a credit insurance linn to bear risk while retaining thc other
func&iona. Onc imponani consideration in formulating credit policy regarding thc four credit
I'unctions is whether to utilize an outsourcing alternatives or to employ an internal mechanism
to manage thc funciion.
CREDIT INVESTIGATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
The first ol'hc four functions is credit investigation and risk asscsstnent, which
involves the collection and evaluation of information rclcvant to the customer's ability io pay
and its policies with respect to making payment. This information is accumulated, then
analyzed to provide an assessment of likely payment time and credit risk.
~C'di t st:&».T:.g'''dt lt:., t;hdh':h
acumen, payments to thc trade, the linancial health ol'hc business and iLh owners, and so finch
are collected. Some informaiitm of this sort will have bccn accumulated as pa&t ul'hc selling
prt&cess; contacts bctwecn salespeople and the buyer allow thc seller to acquirc insight into th«
buyer's competency. This knnwledge can come from thc seller's intimacy with thc marketing
channel in which it operates (Smith «c Schnuckcr, 1994), or because the salesperson visits the
account regularly and is able to monitor its credit worthiness on a continuing basis (Mian 8c
Smith. 1992).
Such knowledge can provide valuable clues regarding credit risk. When the scllcr
knows that "They have to pay because their hank won't give them I'inancing without sccing
'paid'nvoices" or that "They have to come hack hccausc wc have the best puces on sheet
rock," credit risk is less &lain it woultl be othcrwisc.i However. when thc amount ol'credit to
hc granted is large, it is advantageous to accumulate other data on thc buyer, including
inl'om&ation on financial health and payments to thc trade. Onc alternative is I'or thc scllcr to
make inquiries directly to other suppliers, the buyer's bunk, court records. and other
inl'onnation sources. Unlike inl'ormation gleaned as a byproduct of the selling process, such
efforts are ct&stly in iimc and money. Large sellers frequently make such direct inquiri«s in the
management of their credit risks.
Alternatively, ihe scllcr may employ credit inl'onnaiiot& vendors (such as Dun and
Brads&rect or TRW) to colic«& all or parts of this inf'ormation. For tl&e small I'irm, this strategy
is likely to he less costly than accumulating this inl'ormation in-house (for discussion, sce
'hese and &nher examp&eh uf small husiness credit pmctice used in this paper uere suggested hy an annnynutus
I'h'Vlltt'cr.
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Golob, 1987). There are huge returns to scale tn credit data gathering, making the per-unit
costs of data gathering by the small firm considerably higher than for the commercial data
vendor or for the large firm with many customers to investigate. However, information
collected by credit information vendors is neither as timely nor as need-specific as when the
small firm itsell'ollects information at the time the credit decision is being made. Blending
specific credit information with that obtained I'rom credit information vendors may be
necessary to offset these madequacics.
Risk Assessment. This process turns credit information into an assessment of credit
nsk. Internally, the owner/manager can perl'orm this task or can hire a credit professional to
perl'orm it. Again, returns-to-scale are an important consideration. Prot'cssional credit
managers turn credit information into a risk assessmcnt by applying reasonably sophisticated
analysis (Christie & Bracutt, 1986). In general, thc owner/manager will not have this expcrtisc,
and will make errors in credit decisions that someone with this expcrtisc would not make.
These errors are costly in terms ol'ad debt loss and accounts receivable carrying cost, both
of which are proportional to the size of the receivables portfolio. The smaller the receivables
port('olio, the less likely that expenditure ol'hc lixed cost ol'employing a credit analysis is
advantageous. (Il'his is so, smaller firms should recognize the tradeoff and bear greater bad
debt costs and carrying costs than larger firms. There is empincal evidence that such costs are.
in fact, higher for smaller firms; scc Grabowsky, 1976.)
If a credit manager is not hired, the owner/manager or some other internal employee
can perl'onn thc risk assessment task. However, there is an outsourcing alternative some
connncrcial suppliers of credit inf'onnalion also provide indices of credit nsk which are
intended to summarize the information they provide into a smgle risk score. (Good examples
ol'his are the Dun and Bradstreet "Paydex" score or Dun and Bradstrcct rating.)
By employing these indices as assessments of'redit risk, the small firm avoids the
problem of inexpert in-house risk assessment.'owever, there are two dilficulties in basing
the lirm's assessment ol'redit risk on these commercial indices. First, these indices are only
rough indicators ol'credit risk. En'ors in credit risk assessmcnt (relative to what would be best
for the finn if a complete credit analysis were performed), and consequently in credit
decision-making, are a likely result. Second, when risk assessment is outsourced. there is no
direct way for the owner/manager to incorporate the special knowledge gained during the
selling process mto the risk assessment.
CREDIT GRANTING DECISIONS
Credit grantmg decisions arc based on the tradeoff between the costs and risk of
granting credit (credit risk and accounts receivable carrying costs) and the benefits of making
the sale. These benefits may include short-term profitability considerations ("They are buying
'ee "The nnpnct of online business mformatton on the commercial user" ( l 987) I'or n case study of a small firm's
credit approval system based on such indices Nore that non-recourse factonng also performs the credit mvesttgauon
and assessment funcuons, but also requires that the firm give trp other credit funcnons We defer discussion of
non-recourse factonng to a specml section later in this paper
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last year's model and we need thc warehouse space") or longer-tenn benefits ("We haven't sold
in that rcginn before, and we can talk about it to other customers"). The firm must decide
whether credit is to be granted, how much credit is to be granted (thc "credit linc" or "credit
limii"), and thc terms under which credit is to be granted.
Who cts credit and how much credit is ranted. During this step ol'he credit
evaluation process, thc risk assessment is turned into an assessmcnt of credit-worthiness. Like
risk assessment itscl1', the prot'cssional credit manager is likely to make more advantageous
decisions than the small firm's owner/tnanager, hut at a substantial fixed cost.
However, there arc strategies which allow thc seller to cl'I'ectively outsource the
credit-granting decision. Numerous PC-based commercial decisirm support systems arc m&w
available to aid decision-makers in making credit-granting and medit-linc decisions.s These
systems vary greatly in complexity; some utilize expert systems technology to replicate the
judgment ol'n experienced credit manager (for discussion sec Srinivasan dz Kim, 1988) or
give resulhs based rm previously-dcvelripcd siatisticul credit-scoring models (such us Altman's
Z score; Altmtut, 1968) Some require exlensivc credit investigation, while others employ only
a few pieces of credit inl'ormation in their decision methodology.
These decision support systems arc not without their drawb;u:ks. The major cost of
employing these systems to make credit decisions is not the system's acqui si ti on or application,
hul the coal of the inappropriate decisions thai sometimes result Iroin these systems, relative
to what a cnmpctcnt credit manager would recommend. A wide variety OI'types of information
can be rclcvant to credit-granting decisions, but any credit decision support system must
inevitably incorporate assumptions io limit this domain. These tassumptions may or may not
bc appropriate for specific decisions, and thcsc systems have no "cr&mmon sense" tri make thc
necessary adjustments (Coats, 1988).
Credit tet&t&s. While thc small business must generally meet its competition in tcnns
of the number ol'days it allows buyers io take before payment, a ma)or question is whether thc
sellm should oflcr a "cash" discr&unt for payment made in a shorter lcl1glh of time (I'tn example,
a two percent discount I'or payment made in 10 days).'wo differences between small »nd
large firms argue that small I'irma should I'ind thc use ol'cash discounts to bc more attractive
than lurger Iinns, despite the very high cost of such discounts (the yearly cost ol'hc discouni
I'or terms of 2 percent 10 days nct 30 days is over 40 percent).
The Iirst dilference has to do with thc small firm's great&r reliance rm internal cash
Ilows. Because cxternul Iinancing is very cxpensivc, the small firm needs to recoup cash from
'For rcccnr revi ws of tive such syuernv, sec eCredtt vconng and armlysrs. 1999 sofrwarc reviews," 1999 Meall
1199&)also presents overviews ol several computer-hnsr:il sysrcrns intvrtded to aisisr,mall husrrmsvcv wnti
crerlit-grantmg decisinnv nnd other cre&hr I'uncrions
*
'Gcttrng customers ro pay on rirnc How ro rricrease your cash tlow and profits," 1990, suggcsrs that offcnng cash
discounts is an ailvantagcous straregy for small firms
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sales as quickly as possible to linance itself. Therefore small firms should be more willing to
bear the substantial cost ol'hc cash discount than larger firms Second, when lacking thc
expertise of a credit manager. Ihe small linn's assessment of buyers'redit risk is less accurate,
and the taking or skipping of thc cash discount provides an important and useful signal
concerning thc buyer's true credit nsk (Smith. 1987).
COLLECTION DECISIONS
In practice. thc collection function is dichotomized into two types of collections:
routine collections from ongoing customers and collections from accounts which are no longer
purchasing from the scllcr and for whom standard collection efforts (tclcphone calls, letters.
etc.) have failed (scc Christie and Bracuti. 19B6, pp. 495-499).
Unlike many of the other credit functions. where financial expertise, returns to scale,
or cash liow considerations arc imponant, routine collections can usually be economically per-
formed hy thc small firm, and only in special cases is it cost effective to outsource this
function. Thcrc are a I'cw special collection methods that sometimes produce better results, but
most of'hc basic collection techniques are straightf'orward (for dcscnption, sec Christie &
Bracuti. 19g6, pp. 479-514).
However, once standard collection tcchmques have bccn exhausted, it is advantageous
for thc small firm to utilize a collection agency in I'unhcr anempts to collect the debt. When
routine collection cl'I'orts I'ail. the next steps generally involve special expcrtisc in collections
(visiting thc debtor to prr:ss I'or payment, ctc.) or suing the debtor I'or payment. Most small
firms do not have the legal aiul collection expertise necessary to perform these functions
in-house, but collection agcncics specialize in such matters. (For more on collection agencies
and what they do, scc Christie and Bracuti, 19gfx pp. 497-499 and 513-514.)
BEARING CREDIT RISK
Ol'all the contrasts bctwcen appropriate credit policies for large and small firms, the
greatest difl'ercnce occurs with rcspcct to bearing credit risk. Because their costs of external
capital are so much higher than large linns, small linus must rely morc heavily on cash inliows
from sales, which come to the linn via the collection of trade receivables. The default of a
debtor rcduccs these collections. The small linn should therefore be much more averse to
credit risk than thc large lirm
Thus. while thc laige finn may choose simply to hear the credit risk. the small firm
should be morc inclined to lind a hcdgc against this risk. Both external and internal hedging
strategies arc availablc. Externally, thc linn can outsource the bearing of this risk by
purchasing credit insurance. Credit insurance is available for thc firm's entire receivables
portfolio or I'or specific customers, ihough such insurance is costly (Mian & Smith, 1992).
Another alternative is to accept business purchasing credit cards or personal credit
cards in payment I'or iradc purchases. Acceptance ol'hese cards is predominant in retailing,
where most small I'irms have adopted them in lieu ol'ther credit arrangements.
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While the credit card issuer bears the credit nsk and pays quickly, thc principal
disadvantage of thcsc cards is their cost, which is typically 1.75-2.5 percent ol'ales for
business purchasing credit cards (Blcaklcy, 1995) and 3-4 percent of sales I'or personal credit
cards (wCredit cards and small business," 1987). Accepting these cards for purchases is
equivalent to advance non-recourse factoring, a topic to be discussed in detail later in this
paper.
There are also internal policy mechanisms that can be used to limit credit risk. The
most common is to impose a credit limit on each debtor and enl'orcc this limit by requiring
payments il'he debtor's balance excccds the limit.'he cost of this, siratcgy is lost sales. II'
debtor places an order which results in its balance exceeding ihs crfxlit limit, cvcn though the
debtor's account is not past duc, enforcement of thc credit limit requires that thc debtor make
a payment to reduce the balance. From a cash flow standpoint, rather than make the payment
the debtor is better off ordering from a competitor, and I'requently docs. When thc amounts
ol'hese
lost sales arc large (as when the debtor is a major customer but cntails substantial credit
risk), the purchase of credit insurance may offer morc advantage than enforcing the credit limit,
even allowing I'or the cost of this insurance.
When the buyer is incorporated, another mechanism which can he used to limit risk
is to obtain a personal guarantee of the debt from the owner. This guaruntce enhances thc
likelihood ol'collecting the debt and increases thc recovery if the buyer del'aults. (Sce Scherr,
1989b, I'or analysis of the cfl'ects ol'ersonal guarantees and similar strategies on
credit-granting.)
ON NON-RECOI)RSyE FACTORING
Prior discussion suggcstcd that, while there arc internal strategies which will achieve
many ol'he same results, there are advantages to thc small I'inn in outsourcing all credit
functions except routine collections. Using non-recourse factonng outsources all of thcsc
I'unctions (though routine collections are also passed on to the facior). Yct only a tiny fraction
ol'mall non-retailing firms usc I'actoring."
Why don't more small lions usc non-recourse factoring'? One possibility is that small
firms may Iind advantage in retaining some credit I'unctions but not others. Another
explanation is that, because thc factor's margin on the sale is less than the selling I'irm's, the
I'actor can bear less credit risk. As a result, factors'redit-granting policies may be too
conservative I'or many sellers.
'ee Reranek and Schcrr 11991)for discussmn of the venous types ol credit limits and then use hy large firms nn&l
Scherr (1992) for discussinn of credtt tom ts stralcgy and development of a mathernancal model for settmg crcdn
ltrntts
"The Federal keserve's Annual Statistical Ruttettn estnnates that only 888 billion irt rccetvables, whtch ts a very small
fracrton of tourt business rccctvahles, were lactored in 198S; see Mian and Smnh, 199', p. 1911
40
Still another explanation may lie with the reputation of factoring as a high-cost
strategy (Farringer, l986). When I'actoring is discussed, the costs typically quoted are for
advance non-recourse factoring. In advance I'actoring, in addition to performing credit
functions, the factor buys the receivable on a discounted basis and pays immediately, providing
financing for the linn. The fees for this financing function, along with I'ees for credit
functions, result in fairly large total costs (see Smith & Schnucker, 1994. for discussion of this
point). However. the rclcvant cost I'or credit management services only is much lower;
Farringer (l986) estimates that the typical factor's I'ee for credit functions is only one percent
of thc face value of the receivable. Despite the problems in differing incentives and
consequent credit-granting decisions bctwccn thc finn and the factor. this is a reasonably
auractive level of cost for many stnall firms in return for performing credit investigation and
risk assessment, making credit granting decisions, performing collections, and bearing credit
risk.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
Several factors make thc small firms'hoice ol'redit stratcgics quite different from
that of larger linns. Small firms have limited cxpertisc in financial analysis, face
returns-to-scale disadvantages in managing credit, and have morc difficulty in raising funds
externally than do large firms. Thc challcngc to thc small fimi's owner/manager is to formulate
an effective credit strategy that reflects these factors. This strategy can utilize mechanisms
internal to the firm or can cotnbinc thcsc with outsourcing alternatives.
This article generates policy recommendations for small firms based on the trade
credit literature. The resulting recommendations, minus their rationales (which are given in
the body ol'he paper), are presented in Table 2. This table assumes that the seller does not
employ a professional credit manager and that the seller chooses not to accept corporate credit
cards or utilize non-recourse factoring, each of which extcrnalizes all credit functions. 'In any
case, the small firm needs to consider carel'ully the benefits and costs of alternative credit
management policies in developing its credit strategy.
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Tahle I
Inrlinnirma! Oulsaarcing A!ternati l es fnr Credit Managelnenr
Credit Managcmcnt Who Docs Who Makes Who Docs Who Bears
Strategy Credit Credit Collections? Credit
Investigation Granting Risk'
and Risk Decisions?
Assessment'!
General Corporate Firm Firm I' l'nl I irm
Crctlit
Usc ol'a Credit Credit Firm I'I l'nl Ftfn1
Inlol'nnnlon Irllln Inlollrnnton
I irm
Use of a Collection Firm Fl I'Irl Collection Firm
Agency Agency
Usc ol' Credit Fi I'nl Finn Inl I'nl Credit
InsolllnCC Conlptnly hlsalanlCC
Conlpany
RccoUI'sc I'aclol'Ing Firm Fiml Factor F1 sin
Non-RccoUfsc I'actol Factor Factor I actor
FUCIOI1flg
Scarce: Adapted I'rom Mian and Smith (l992k
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Table 2
Trade Credit Policy Recomntendationsfor Smrtll Firnis
Policy Reconnncndation
1. Credit Investigation
and Risk Assessment
A. Investigation Purchase credit inf'onnation from commercial credit
inf'ormation vendors whmtcver possible.
B. Risk Assessment Usc a commercial index (fMB rating, Paydex. etc.) to
summarixc many aspects of credit risk.
2. Credit Granting
A. Who Gets Credit Usc commercial decision softw«re to make
credit-gr«nting decisions and to assign credit limits. but
bcwarc of thc limited dmnain of these systems.
B. Credit Terms Usc cash discounts, even if larger coinpctitors do not,
to spccd collections and provide inl'ormation on the
credii worthiness of'uyers.
3. Collections
A. Routine Collections Perl'orm thcsc in-house.
B. Collections from Outsource these to collection «gcncics.
Defaulted Buyers
4. Bearing Credit Risk I:mploy crctlit limits to limit losses in dcl'suit.
Howcvclx wlit'll clilof'ci fig ii credit limit icsults in lost
sales I'rom a major customer, use credit insurance
instead. Consider requiring incorporated buyers to
provide personal guarantees.
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